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Abstract
This article explores the cultural dimensions of 
European security policies. It looks at three main 
questions. The first relates to the impact of various 
European cultures on the emergence or not of a 
European culture of defence. The second, explores 
how cultural change in the European defence sec-
tor can impact EU’s external action as a whole. 
Third, the article outlines actions and policy mea-
sures that would contribute both to the faster 
development of European cultures of defence 
while contributing to the defence of cultures world-
wide. Investments will be required in at least two 
areas for defence sectors: life-long practice-oriented 
interdisciplinary intercultural learning for security 
and defence staff, and enhanced creative and artis-
tic partnerships with cultural professionals, in 
Europe and beyond. Strategic creativity has 
become as important as creative strategies.
Resumo
Europa: Culturas de Defesa e a Defesa de Culturas
O artigo explora as dimensões culturais das políticas de 
segurança europeias à luz de três questões. A primeira 
relaciona-se com o impacto de várias culturas europeias 
sobre a possibilidade ou não de emergência de uma cul-
tura de defesa europeia. A segunda explora como é que 
alterações culturais no setor da defesa europeia podem 
ter impacto sobre a ação externa da União Europeia como 
um todo. A terceira sugere ações e medidas políticas, que 
possam contribuir para um desenvolvimento mais célere 
de culturas de defesa europeias, ao mesmo tempo que 
contribuem para uma cultura de defesa mundial. Dois 
requisitos serão necessários: uma prática de aprendiza-
gem interdisciplinar e intercultural para profissionais 
que trabalhem nos setores da segurança e defesa e o 
incentivo parcerias com parceiros no domínio da cultura, 
na Europa e para além desta.
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Europe: Cultures of Defence and the Defence of Cultures
Introduction
Recent progress in Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and Permanent 
Structured Cooperation (PESCO) seems to show the EU defence agenda is growing 
(at least rhetorically1), in tune with EU opinion polls that have regularly confirmed 
the appetite of EU citizens for a more ‘Europeanised’ approach to security and 
defence (European Commission, 2017a)2. The 2017 Reflection Paper on the future 
of European Defence speaks of convergence and alignment of strategic cultures 
through training, joint exercises and joint military interventions (European 
Commission, 2017b). This vision has been emphasized by French President Macron 
and intensely commented by security and defence experts3.
However, in contrast with the optimistic PESCO narrative (partly designed to 
counterbalance the negative impact of the ‘Brexit’ referendum) and perhaps para-
doxically, European strategic convergence and internal cohesion is in halt: European 
leaders’ inability to deal with migration shocks reveals a crisis in EU governance. 
Controversial and slow responses to the financial and bank crisis have affected 
cohesion amongst Europeans (Janning, 2017). An EU existential crisis narrative has 
emerged, fed by ‘eurosceptic’, ‘EUsceptic’ and other so-called ‘populist’ political 
forces4.
This article departs from the assumption that, beyond efforts deployed within offi-
cers education mobility initiatives (such as EMilYO inspired by ERASMUS), this 
perceived EU existential crisis also has cultural (other would say normative) origins 
and looks at its roots and implications in the security and defence sector. 
Defence cooperation in Europe develops in a variety of formats inside or outside 
EU institutional frameworks. Internal disagreements (often linked to cultural 
differences not least between Germany, France and the UK) towards European 
futures have often slowed down defence integration.
This article explores the cultural dimensions of European security policies and 
seeks to answer the following question: is there a conducive environment in 2018 
for the emergence of a European culture of defence, and what would be the role of 
culture in it? 
Let’s first clarify the terms used here. In the case of European policies (and in this 
article), culture means two things: human worldviews and habits as well as various 
1 See Maulny (2017). 
2 Key findings include: for almost eight in ten respondents, the term security brings to mind 
something positive (78%); nearly one in five considers security as negative (19%). Almost two 
thirds (65%) are in favour of a common foreign policy of the 28 Member States. Three quarters 
of respondents are in favour of a common defence and security policy among EU Member States 
(75%). More than half of all respondents (55%) are in favour of the creation of an EU army. 
3 See Whitney (2018). 
4 See Brack and Costa (eds.) (2012); Brack and Startin (2015) and Bertoncini and Koenig (2014). 
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artistic expressions5. Culture – a complementary competence of the EU6 – is back on 
the EU agenda: the 2017 Goteborg declaration aims at strengthening European 
identity through culture and education (European Commission, 2017c). The EU 
Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy refers to culture seventeen times7 
and the 2017 Council conclusions on international cultural relations encourage the 
cultural dimensions of external action (Council of the European Union, 2017). 
Initiative 4 of the European Year for Cultural also included the transformation of 
military heritage (European Commission, 2018). 
By ‘European culture of Defence’, we refer here to the idea of shared sets of norms, 
beliefs and practices about foreign, military and security policies in Europe. In that 
sense, a European culture of Defence is broader than a ‘European Defence culture’: it 
involves and interacts with groups and communities that are not part of the profes-
sional security system. It is close to the notion of ‘security culture’ or ‘strategic culture’ 
but does not entirely overlap with them because it has a stronger societal dimension8. 
It is much broader than the notion of a European Industrial defence identity. 
Defence is cultural in many ways: by interpreting, anticipating and addressing 
security threats, it is the expression of a group’s worldview and values. The Defence 
sector interacts with other EU culture-related policies. In that sense, Defense has 
cultural dimensions. When Defence is combined with development cooperation to 
train, equip, build military capacities or assist in Security Sector Reform, what is 
often at stake is a cultural (or mentality) change. 
Military diplomacy combined with external and strategic communications (audio-
visual in particular) inherently carry culturally-loaded messages both in their style 
and content (European External Action Service, 2013; Piras, 2018). They shape and 
are shaped by perceptions. In other words, when Defence policies interact with a 
range of other policies (research and education, environment, cultural heritage, and 
of course cultural policies and other forms of artistic expressions), their cultural 
dimensions are significant and should be considered seriously. 
Defence is also a cultural expression in itself, expressing what a society is expe- 
riencing, even if it is not part of the cultural sector: military architectural heritage, 
uniforms’ and weapons styles, combat aircrafts design, military flags and logos, 
5 The EU is “committed to promoting a tolerant, pluralistic approach to international cultural 
relations” (European Commission, 2016).
6 “The Union shall contribute to the flowering of the cultures of the Member States, while 
respecting their national and regional diversity and at the same time bringing the common 
cultural heritage to the fore. Action by the Union shall be aimed at encouraging cooperation 
between Member States and, if necessary, supporting and supplementing their action (...)”. 
Article 167, Treaty of the European Union.
7 This includes the words ‘culture’ and ‘cultural’ (European Union, 2016). 
8 See Howorth (2002) and Nunes (2010) among others, on debates about those concepts.
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informal and official music but also films, series for or about soldiers, warriors, 
security or super heroes relate to important forms of creation and aesthetics in our 
societies. 
Since World War II, defence cooperation in Europe has developed within a variety 
of formats, yet territorial defence has been largely dominated by NATO. Individual 
national defence cooperation of Member States with bilateral partners has been 
shaped by historical, political and economic ties as well as normative features. In 
parallel, the EU policy layer of European Defence has emerged in the 1990s and 
focused on external security interventions. It is steadily getting thicker, although 
still very much framed by NATO and transatlantic relations. 
Foreign and security policies in Europe are very much marked by the encounter of 
various military and security cultures, influenced by national patterns and tradi-
tions. NATO prevalence means that US military culture dominates European 
defence systems. In wider cultural and societal terms, Europe and the US have also 
influenced each other to great extent9. This led Robert Cooper, the pen holder of the 
2003 European security strategy to state that Europe is “a subset of the American 
order”10. 
The emergence of ESDP/CSDP in the 1990s had already raised the question of an 
EU military, defence and security culture that would be distinct from a NATO and 
US-dominated one. Under the leadership of Donald Trump, European and US lead-
erships are experiencing the widening of their differences. Acute divergences 
appear in several external policy areas such as trade and defence. Contradictions 
reveal themselves in cultural attitudes and behaviours, use of social media and 
positioning on Western ethical references such as truth, science, cultural diversity, 
humanism and justice. How will this new context of US-EU relationship affect 
European cultures of defence? 
This article looks at three main questions. The first one relates to the impact of 
various European cultures on the emergence or not of a European culture of 
Defence. Second, it explores how cultural change in the European defence sector 
can impact EU’s external action as a whole. Thirdly, it sketches out actions and 
policy measures that would contribute both to the faster development of European 
cultures of defence while contributing to the defence of cultures worldwide. 
European Cultures of Defence: Engaging Societies
For security and defence experts, acknowledging (and categorising) political, soci-
etal and cultural differences amongst national defence systems in Europe usually 
9 See Pells (1997). 
10 Speech at the 2014 EUISS Annual Conference, personal note of the author. See also Wallace 
(2016).
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comes at the end of the analysis. It is the wall against which defence integration 
bumps, and pauses. This is where the journey of this article actually starts: by 
exploring interactions between societies and Defence, beyond officers’ education 
schemes. The literature on security and defence policy in Europe has taught us 
three main messages in that regard. 
First, a lot of research has addressed at length the question of a European strategic 
culture, echoing initial attempts to foster a European security and defence culture11. 
Some descriptive analytical work has been done on the differences between national 
strategic and security cultures and on national visions of European defence. Edited 
volumes or seminars are often structured along supposed national belonging and 
expertise: the British scholar writes about the UK, Germans about Germany and so 
forth12. Cultural differences usually serve as independent variables explaining why 
there is no or limited defence convergence. 
Sociological studies have also shown that various groups in a given country hold 
various cultures of defence. Various schools of thought and specialised networks 
and communities dealing with security and defence co-exist across the national 
boundaries of defense systems in Europe: this transnational feature of a European 
culture of defence (expressed among others by Irondelle’s formula ‘Europeanisa-
tion without the EU’) is probably to be explored more deeply in the future. 
Second, some attention has been paid to the process of Europeanisation within 
national security systems (Jacoby and Jones, 2008; Paile-Calvo, 2016). There is 
however still limited forward looking studies on the required change within 
national cultural systems vis-à-vis security and defence issues. Those questions lie 
at the intersection of security policy studies, cultural/anthropological studies and 
sociological studies on values, beliefs, socialisation and cultural expressions. 
The state of the art of research on ‘europeanisation’ in security and defence sectors 
has mapped the various channels through which change happens (socialisation, 
download/upload, through EU regulations or not, etc.)13. 
Thirdly, recent work by Malena Britz (2016) on strategic culture explored the condi-
tions under which strategic culture can change or evolve, for instance studying the 
justifications of the participation in international military operations (the case of 
Germany in particular is interesting). Other factors are related to internal societal 
dynamics (for instance the presence of Kurdish populations in Germany and its 
impact on Germany’s interventions against Daesh and in support of Kurdish 
11 See WEU Assembly document A/1816, Recommendation n°724, “Developing a security and 
defence culture in the ESDP”, 3 June 2003; rapporteur: Mrs Katseli. Quoted by Paile-Calvo 
(2016). 
12 See for example Santopinto and Price (eds.) (2013) and Fiott (ed.) (2015). 
13 See Hoeffler and Faure (2015). 
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fighters). A third factor to look at, but too often neglected, is the relationship 
between strategic culture and political culture.
These recent findings seem particularly relevant to our discussions on a European 
culture of defence, as they look at a wider spectrum of stakeholders and constituen-
cies (including for instance various cultural or – previously – migrant communities 
as well as public opinion writ large). They also match the need to analyse cultures 
of defence through the interactions between European internal societal dynamics 
and external security and defence actions. 
In this context, investing more in the cultural connections and interactions of 
defence systems with European societies becomes a necessity. It is the only way to 
grasp, anticipate and influence the evolution of various (including transnational) 
European cultures of Defence. Gathering such knowledge would contribute to 
identify the conditions under which a certain collective vision of security and 
defence could or should prevail in Europe and in external action. It will help us 
understand how mental barriers and cultural lines can move, converge, collide or 
clash, and how mental shifts and cultural changes may happen in the design and 
implementation of EU external action. 
Three examples of connections between societies and defence systems can be 
mentioned here and could inspire future research agendas, to feed in EU external 
action strategic planning. 
The first connection is the most well-known example: it is related to the educa- 
tion of officers and soldiers. The second one concerns cultural heritage policies, 
including the policies of memory, historical narratives as well as tangible (archi- 
tectural military sites) and intangible heritage (common myths, trauma and 
misunderstandings)14. The third one has to do with the linkages between cultural 
and artistic expressions (including audiovisual, digital productions and even video 
games) and their interaction with security and defence systems. 
Defence and Culture in EU External Action: Priority to Trust-building
Developing the Defence-culture nexus nationally and in Europe will bring more 
coherence between domestic politics and European external action. 
Domestically, it would help reconcile people’s perceptions of national and Euro-
pean security priorities. This would provide some answers to the ongoing political 
volatility. On the foreign affairs side, more open, more resilient and more credible 
security apparatuses in the eyes of their own societies, will be better equipped to 
assert a well-understood European approach to collective defence and human 
security. The Defence-culture nexus brings answers to three main transformations 
in EU’s external action. 
14 See Bouchard (2016). 
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Change number one is about European societies’ management of their own cultural 
diversification. Europe’s attractiveness still seems quite powerful (despite intercul-
tural tensions and lack of cohesion). To put it differently, European societies are 
facing new intercultural realities. It is the result of various dynamics: EU enlarge-
ment; freedom of circulation within the enlarged EU; globalisation of migration 
flows, consequences of conflicts in Eastern Europe, the Middle East and Africa; 
postcolonial realities, reopening of previously closed migration routes towards 
Europe. In that case, external factors impact Europeans collectively even – if not 
evenly – and provoke change within European societies. 
In addition to dealing with their own various strategic cultures, European defence 
sectors now also have to deal with the strategic dimensions of cultural diversity, 
at two levels: in the societies they are supposed to protect, and in their external 
action writ large (Wong, 2013). New cultural alliances will be needed by European 
governments as well as by European individuals, networks and corporations. Inter-
cultural sensitivity is a new priority for the EU, internally as well as in its external 
action: this is implication number one. 
From the above, the derived question therefore is: How can various European 
cultures of Defence contribute to build trust worldwide in an interculturally-aware 
manner? This is looked at in the third part of this article. 
Cultural change number two relates to the consequences of Donald Trump’s 
behaviour towards NATO. The so-called ‘West’ is entering a fragmentation phase. 
It is creating new opportunities and opening new spaces for European engagement 
in the world in politics as well as with societies at large.
The usual transatlantic love story (which was initially an American idea and an 
American project) is getting old. The idea of Europe as a part of the American world 
and the West becomes partly outdated. As Ivan Krastev (2018) recently wrote, the 
time when the US had European allies is over. In politics, the norms and values of 
“predictability and reciprocity” and on behalf of which European governments 
used to stand up for together with America, are not shared anymore. Old friends 
might not be friends any longer. This might be untrue at the level of societies where 
some engagement will still be required. 
European governments need to defend themselves from betrayals originating from 
their closest ally and that have far reaching consequences beyond security and 
defence cooperation: on trade, political and emotional ties. 
With Trump’s frontal attacks against the European members of NATO and the 
EU, the equation and the paradigms of European security and defence policy-
making have changed from the outside (one change factor identified by Euro- 
peanisation theorists). In the long run, relying on the US to keep NATO sus- 
tainable is becoming risky, and costly for each EU Member states individually. 
European strategic autonomy is not an option anymore, it has become an impera-
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tive for Europeans as they each are losing access and credibility in the eyes of 
Trump’s America. 
If this is really a paradigm change, implications are immense. First, Europeans have 
to reinterpret their respective national belonging to ‘the West’ … or to themselves. 
‘The West’ has to be reinterpreted culturally and politically by revisiting the trust-
building terms of European relations with the US government and with the 
American people. Second, it means Europeans need to find and keep allies outside 
the ‘West’. Building trust with them will be one of the first priorities for EU external 
action. Reinventing trust-building is therefore implication number two, and it 
involves cultural relations. 
Change number three has to do with the strategic relevance of cultural expressions 
in a digital age. Phases of peace and prosperity in human history were also phases 
of cultural innovation and creation. Innovation also came from military and security 
investments. Peace has been a founding stone of European integration after unprece- 
dented bloodsheds. In an age of artificial intelligence and environmental fragility, 
immaterial value will be pursued, reinforced by irrational dispositions such as 
beliefs, feelings and prejudices. Fake news and the manipulation of public opinions 
and consumers through big data are already the latest manifestations of this trend. 
In an uncertain connected world, those able to generate trust and emotions will 
generate movements of peaceful change. Cultural expressions in their diversity are 
an endless source of inspiration and emulating value. Their promotion, preserva-
tion and enhancement, beyond cyber security cooperation, will become a strategic 
asset in an interconnected, contested and dematerialised world. 
Implication number three is that European defence sectors have to invest in stra-
tegic creativity by developing peace-focused partnerships with the cultural and 
creative industries to protect artistic freedom and recognition. In terms of innova-
tion, boundaries between the civilian and the military are already blurred. The 
same will happen between the military and the creative. 
The regulation of internet or laws on robots and intelligent objects will also reflect 
visions of our future societies. If there is a European way of life (although it was 
developed with the support of the US since WWII) that is worth being defended in 
the future, what type of defence systems will be ready to protect the diversity of its 
cultural expressions? 
To conclude this second part, it seems quite clear that our strategic reappraisal in 
2018 points towards the need for at least three innovations in European defence 
policies summed up as follows: first, to build trust within and beyond the ‘West’; 
second, enhancing intercultural approaches in external action; third, in partnership 
with creative and cultural professionals. 
The next section delves into the concrete measures that could be adopted in that 
regard. 
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Defending Cultures: Creative Partnerships as a Strategic Agenda 
The contribution of EU defence policies to trust-building are already framed by the 
EU Global Strategy and the strategic approach to international cultural relations 
and could be synthesized by the moto “European cultures of Defence to defend 
culture”. Specific measures that would contribute to this objective revolve around 4 
main themes and methods. 
First, a strategic approach to the Defence and culture nexus could be developed 
through cross-disciplinary work between various cultural professionals and 
institutions (Foreign Affairs, Defence and Cultural ministries, Parliaments, devel-
opment cooperation, humanitarian affairs, education, environment, health, to name 
but a few). It would enhance cultural awareness and connections between the secu-
rity and defence sector and other organisations dealing with external cultural 
affairs15. 
Second, the theme of heritage and memory has already been identified as a relevant 
and promising one. In the short term, cooperation between museums, military sites 
and other cultural institutions (for instance the House of European History) on 
heritage and memory management (particularly with digital technologies, 3D and 
video games) could be further enhanced16. Some more collaborative work on Euro-
pean defence myths, heroes and mindsets (such as the Dunkirk and Saint-Malo 
mindsets17) could also be envisaged. 
Thirdly, the field of education and socialisation is the most advanced and its cultural 
potential remains to be exploited more deeply. It is commonly assumed that 
increased socialisation between European officers will lead to a shared strategic 
culture. Yet military Erasmus and joint interventions remain confined to the closed 
world of the defence system. Connecting more systematically security staff 
exchanges with civilians and cultural education professionals would contribute to 
accelerate the exchange and encounter of ideas, symbols and references. This would 
allow defence and cultural professionals to work jointly on mental maps and on the 
perception of interests and threats. 
Finally, the three measures above (comprehensive policy-making, the cultivation of 
heritage and memory, and more investment in education and socialisation) will 
require closer cooperation between European defence systems and societies and 
cultural professionals. At the end of the day, mutual understandig between security 
and cultural professionals will benefit European societies as a whole, perhaps 
making armies and security systems look cool (again?) and changing the percep-
15 This has already materialised in the past through pilot initiatives such as a TV series on police 
in Afghanistan (Commissar Ammanullah) or radio fiction series on piracy in Somalia. 
16 See Gensburger and Lavabre (2012) and Calligaro and Foret (2012). 
17 See European Commission (2017d). 
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tions that security professionals have of creatives. One example of this version of 
EU’s ‘comprehensive approach’ could be the launch of a Defence Diplomacy 
Dialogue (3D) culture programme as a component of the Defence Research Prepa-
ratory Action and future European Defence Research Programme (European 
Defence Agency, 2017). The upcoming Horizon Europe programme could also 
potentially be mobilised, or a sui generis initiative on the model of STARTS (Science 
Technology and the Arts) programme (European Commission, 2017e). 
A common culture, if there will be any, will be composed of various cultures of 
security and defence in, between and across Member States boundaries. There will 
be several models, from fusion, to co-existence and, perhaps, compositions. One 
can expect that the more diverse creative partnerships will be built between defence 
and culture, the more trust will be generated inside and outside Europe.
Conclusion
Current strategic and cultural environments in Europe are closely interacting with 
trends in world politics. In an uncertain Western context influenced by unpre- 
dictable US leadership, European policy-makers have started to underline the rele-
vance of a specific culture of Defence in parallel with the stronger recognition and 
promotion of the role of culture (both as intercultural literacy and the flourishing of 
cultural expressions) in European integration and external action. 
Our first conclusion is that the last decades have shown some increased cultural 
convergence within and between European security systems. European security 
and defence communities and groups have more to share politically, technologi-
cally and culturally (in interventions overseas but not only) than 20 years ago. It is 
nonetheless still hard to imagine today the rapid emergence of a single culture of 
Defence of Europe. Yet, if territorial defence turns out to be the new priority for 
Europeans because of a serious American withdrawal from the ‘old continent’, a 
cultural shift could happen relatively quickly. 
In that case, the socialisation process encouraged by military mobility and exchanges 
would intensify. It can certainly be reinforced in the fields of education, research, 
training and the cultivation of debated memories and heritage. While variety will 
remain a strong feature of the European defence sector, working consciously 
and pragmatically towards an open, dynamic and internally diverse culture of 
Defence is a vision that should be discussed and planned more precisely in Euro-
pean capitals.
Secondly, a more culturally inspired Defence policy would contribute to mutual 
transformations within the various areas of EU external action. For instance, some 
investment in military exchanges with external partners about digital creativity (in 
connection with cyber security), shared memories, shared heritage or cultural 
products and pieces of arts (linked to defence-related issues) could help deepen 
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relationships with them. A more elaborated and explicit strategic approach to 
the Defence-culture nexus (not speaking of wider security-culture nexus) still has 
to be developed as part of EU external action and European public diplomacy, 
through and in compliment of official EU policy and communication channels. One 
challenge is to make EU military “look cool again”; a second one is to envisage an 
EU soft power strategy that would encompass a Defence component in an overall 
EU’s image management approach.
Finally, the new EU Multi-annual Financial Framework offers new opportunities 
with the creation of a single instrument for external action, to be combined with the 
one on security with the possibility to develop synergies with cultural action. For 
the next seven years and beyond, the legal basis is in place to pilot and experiment 
fruitful combinations within an EU security and culture agenda. Ambitious socia- 
lisation and mobility initiatives will be necessary but not sufficient. Investments 
will be required in at least two areas for defence sectors to be in tune with the 
complexities of the societies and the cultures they are supposed to protect: life-long 
practice-oriented interdisciplinary intercultural learning for security and defence 
staff, and enhanced creative and artistic partnerships with cultural professionals, in 
Europe and beyond. 
The defence sector and cultural professionals rarely speak to each other, yet their 
work nurtures and enables one another. More peace and security enables more 
culture, and more cultural expressions nurtures well-being, peaceful cooperation 
and secure coexistence. Technological and geopolitical transformations are putting 
defence and culture closer to each other: strategic creativity has become as impor-
tant as creative strategies. 
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